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The problem addressed in this study is the lack of information relating to the 
viability of unbundling as a strategy for companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange (ZSE). The study sought to determine whether the unbundling of listed 
companies on the ZSE has resulted in the maximisation of shareholder wealth and an 
improvement in the performance of the unbundled entities. 
The sample consists of spin-offs undertaken by listed companies between 
January 2000 and December 2005. The starting and ending points for the sample 
period were dictated by data availability. No spin-offs were identified prior to January 
2000. The sample frame is composed of seven listed companies that have unbundled 
and whose unbundled entities were subsequently listed on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange. In total sixteen companies emerged from the seven companies that 
unbundled and all sixteen companies were studied. Returns of parent and spun-off 
companies were computed to determine if unbundling resulted in cumulative 
abnormal returns. The value uplift of resultant firms was compared with the industrial 
index to determine if unbundling resulted in overall value uplift in the companies that 
unbundled. Questionnaires were also administered on financial executives of the 
parent and spun-off companies as well as stockbrokers to establish their views on the 
outcome of unbundling. 
The study finds that positive cumulative abnormal returns accrued as a result of 
unbundling and that value uplift in the resultant companies after unbundling is greater 
than the value uplift in the industrial index. The study also finds that significant 
drivers behind the decision to unbundle include the need to unlock shareholder value, 
focus on core competences and facilitation of future growth. 
Conclusions drawn from the study are that unbundling unlocks shareholder 
value, leads to performance improvement, results in value uplift of the unbundled 
entities and that it results in the elimination of information asymmetry. The study 
IV 
recommends that investors should position themselves in companies that have plans 
to unbundle as they tend to benefit significantly. It also concludes that unbundling is a 
viable strategy and consequently conglomerates that have experienced declines in 
performance as a result of diversification should unbundle. 
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The ultimate justification of any unbundling policy is that it leads to an increase 
in shareholder wealth. After a period of acquisition activity, a company may find that 
it has bought several large groups of businesses; some related to its chosen core 
activities but some connected with non-core activities and in the process it has 
become over geared (Lynch, 2004). Devogelaer (2003) cites Markides (1992b, 1995) 
who finds that high levels of diversification result in inefficiencies that may lead to a 
decline in performance. The need to improve performance through focusing on core 
activities may lead to the unbundling of companies. Lynch (2004) further notes that in 
the United Kingdom, high interest rates in the late 1980s started the process of 
unbundling. 
Several studies report positive shareholder returns for unbundled entities and 
their parent companies for up to three years following unbundling. Cusatis, Miles & 
Woolridge (1993), Daley, Mehrotra & Sivakumar (1997) and Desai & Jain (1998) 
among others find evidence of positive long run abnormal returns. The empirical 
literature currently available on the performance effect of unbundling is largely 
focused on firms outside Africa, for example firms in America and Europe. This is 
due to the longer history and higher frequency of unbundling in these continents. 
Though international studies report that unbundling is a viable option, it is not known 
whether unbundling of companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) is a 
viable option as well. The findings of this study will be used to judge whether the 
unbundling exercise has achieved the intended objectives and is therefore a viable 
strategy. 
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1.2 Background and Context 
In their study, Cusatis et al. (1983) indicate that both the unbundled entities and 
their parents offer significantly positive abnormal returns. In line with their 
indications, there has been an increase in the number of listed companies in 
Zimbabwe, which are unbundling with a view to unlocking shareholder value and 
improving performance. This study examines the aims and consequences of the 
unbundling activity of companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). In 
Zimbabwe, unbundling is in the form of a spin-off and the term used is 'distribution in 
specie'. The restructuring involves a pro-rata distribution of shares of the newly 
formed corporate entity to shareholders of the original company. Shareholders 
become owners of two separate companies; the original company that is maintained 
and the spin-off entity (http://www.zse.co.zw). Unbundling in Zimbabwe was sparked 
off by the unbundling of the Mashonaland Holdings Group in 2000. Since then, a 
total of nine listed companies unbundled and seven of these had their unbundled 
entities subsequently listed on the ZSE (http://www.zse.co.zw). 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Several studies indicated that unbundling is a viable strategic decision. Davies 
et al. (1994) finds not only a one-third drop in the level of total diversification among 
Fortune 500 firms between 1980 and 1990, but also a more than forty percent decline 
in their level of unrelated diversification. Several studies report positive shareholder 
returns for unbundled entities and their parent companies. According to Brown, Kaur, 
Maugham & Rendall, (1995) constituent businesses of conglomerates are being split 
up because of the need to unlock shareholder value; as a means of raising funding for 
the unbundled entities as they can approach the market in their own right; there is no 
advantage in their remaining together (no synergy); greater motivation would be 
generated in the respective management teams if they have more autonomy and in 
order to concentrate investment in the core business. In their study, Cusatis et al. 
(1983) indicate that both the spin off and their parents offer significantly positive 
abnormal returns to shareholders. 
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As from 2001 some companies listed on the ZSE started unbundling. Their 
objectives were in line with indications from Cusatis et al. (1983) of achieving 
positive returns and the prospects of reaping the advantages highlighted by Brown et 
al. (1995). Studies have been conducted on unbundling in Zimbabwe by Nyandoro 
(2004), Senderayi (2004) and Gonde (2003), but these studies focused on the 
unbundling of companies that are not listed on the ZSE making it difficult to conclude 
that their findings apply to companies that have unbundled and are listed on the ZSE. 
It is presently unknown whether unbundling is a viable strategy for companies listed 
on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. The problem addressed in this study is the lack of 
information relating to the viability of unbundling as a strategy for companies listed 
on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of the study is to investigate the viability of unbundling 
as a strategy for companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. In order to 
achieve this objective it is necessary to attain a number of secondary objectives. 
The secondary objectives of this research are 
• To review the theoretical explanations for unbundling; 
• To review the outcome of unbundling in other countries; 
• To assess the effects of unbundling on listed companies which are 
unknown in Zimbabwe; 
• To determine whether the unbundling of companies listed on the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange has resulted in the maximisation of 
shareholder wealth and an improvement in the performance of the 
unbundled entities. 
1.4.1 Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following questions: 
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1. What were the most significant drivers behind the decisions to 
unbundle? 
2. Were the initially stated objectives of the unbundled companies 
achieved? 
3. Is there a relationship between unbundling and an increase in share 
price? 
4. Are positive shareholder returns experienced before, at the time of 
unbundling or after? 
5. Did unbundling result in improved performance of the unbundled 
companies? 
6. Is unbundling a viable strategy for companies listed on the ZSE? 
1.5 Research Design 
The research design used in this study is quantitative. Quantitative techniques in 
the form of market-based measures and accounting based measures were applied to 
measure the performance effects of unbundling. Data used to measure market 
performance was obtained from changes in stock market prices and data for 
measuring accounting performance was obtained through the use of a structured 
questionnaire. 
1.5.1 Literature Review 
Several studies have been conducted on unbundling. Harvard Business Review, 
Journals of Finance, recent research papers and Internet publications were reviewed to 
access information on previous research findings. The empirical literature currently 
available on the performance effects of unbundling is largely limited to the experience 
of United States firms. This is due to the longer history and the higher frequency of 
unbundling in United States as compared to Europe, Asia and Africa (Kirchmaier, 
2003). 
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1.5.2 Sample and Sampling Technique 
The sample consists of spin-offs undertaken by listed companies between 
January 2000 and December 2005. The starting and ending points for the sample 
period were dictated by data availability. No spin-offs were identified prior to January 
2000. No spin offs after December 2005 were included in the sample because at the 
time of the analysis those spin-offs had less than one full year of post spin-off data on 
the ZSE. 
The relevant population is composed of all the nine listed companies that have 
unbundled in Zimbabwe. The sample frame is composed of seven listed companies 
that have unbundled and whose unbundled entities were subsequently listed on the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. Two companies were excluded, as they did not meet the 
requirements of the simple. Sixteen companies and their unbundled entities were 
studied because they were representative of the population of interest and met the 
specific needs of the research study. In total sixteen companies emerged from the 
seven listed companies and all sixteen companies were studied. 
1.5.3 Data Collection 
Data was collected from a secondary source, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
(ZSE) in the form of share prices. Based on the market adjusted return model, the 
performance of the individual stock was compared to the performance of the 
industrial index. In addition, the value of shareholding before unbundling, and value 
of holding after unbundling and following the allocation of additional shares (value 
uplift) in the resultant companies was determined and compared to the value uplift of 
the industrial index on and after unbundling. 
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Another set of data was obtained through the use of a questionnaire. 
Questionnaires were hand-delivered, emailed or posted to financial executives of the 
parent, spin-off and stockbrokers. Questionnaires were used instead of interviews in 
order to minimise cost and avoid biased results, which may grow out of three types of 
error: sampling error, non-response error, and response error. 
1.5.4 Questionnaire Design 
The research involves the collection of data and the instrument used was in the 
form of a questionnaire, which consisted of four parts: 
• Part 1 asked for permission to use responses for an academic research. 
• Part 2 asked for the category into which the respondents' organisation 
fell and the drivers of unbundling and whether they were achieved. 
• Part 3 dealt with closed ended questions that asked for opinion on the 
unbundling process. 
• Part 4 dealt with open-ended questions requesting respondents to give 
reasons for the response given. 
1.5.5 Ethical Requirements 
Before administering the questionnaire, the questionnaire and Informed Consent 
Document were submitted to the Ethics Committee of the University for clearance. 
Permission to contact respondents was obtained from the Chief Executive Officers of 
the selected companies after explaining the benefits of the study. The benefits of the 
study and the respondents' rights were also communicated to the financial executives 
of the parent and spin-off, and stockbrokers who are the respondents. The respondents 
were requested to participate in the study through answering the questionnaire after 
securing their informed consent. 
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1.5.6 Data Analysis 
The analysis was divided into three parts: the pre-unbundling, the execution and 
the time after the unbundling. The relative performance of the parent and the 
unbundled entities and the effect was analysed one year prior to unbundling and up to 
three years after execution date. Value uplift of the resultant companies was compared 
to the industrial index. The information gathered from questionnaires was classified 
and analysed using the SPSS Version-12 for Windows. The findings were presented 
in tables showing the position before and after unbundling. Once the data had been 
analysed, conclusions and recommendations were made based on the findings. 
1.6 Importance of Study 
It is imperative to conduct this research in order to: 
• Gain an understanding of whether unbundling really maximises 
shareholder wealth. 
• Help financial executives of the parent and spin off companies to judge 
whether the unbundling exercise in Zimbabwe has achieved the 
intended objectives. 
• Determine the timing of investing in a company; before or after the 
unbundling process. This information will be of immense benefit to 
investment analysts, portfolio managers and the academic fraternity. 
• To provide an agenda for future research in this field as no studies have 
been undertaken on the benefits or effects of unbundling on 
shareholder value and company performance of companies listed on 
the ZSE. 
1.7 Organisation of Study 
The study is organised under five chapters. Chapter Two discusses the 
literature review in relation to unbundling conducted for the study. Chapter Three 
discusses the research methodology and this covers the sampling design, research 
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design, measurement instrument and ethical requirements. Chapter Four deals with 
the analysis of findings from the market behaviour analysis and the questionnaires. 
Conclusions and recommendations are covered in Chapter Five, which is also the last 
chapter of this research. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the problem statement, study objectives, research 
questions and the importance of study. Seven conglomerates unbundled and the 
unbundled entities listed on the ZSE and all the unbundled entities were studied in 
order to establish the performance consequences of unbundling. Though studies have 
been conducted on unbundling in Zimbabwe by Nyandoro (2004), Senderayi (2004) 
and Gonde (2003), these studies focused on the unbundling of companies not listed on 
the ZSE making it difficult to conclude that their findings apply to companies that 
have unbundled and are listed on the ZSE. Market based measure as well as the 
questionnaire were used to gather information on the effects of unbundling. 
Information gathered was analysed using SPSS Vesrion-12 and conclusions drawn. 
The conclusions drawn will be used to determine the timing of investing in a 
company, before or after unbundling. 
Chapter Two presents a review of literature on unbundling. In Chapter Two, 
unbundling is defined and modes of unbundling discussed. This is followed by the 
discussion of the reasons why conglomerates unbundled, findings from previous 
research studies. An overview of companies that unbundled is also given. Finally 





After a period of acquisition activity, a company may find that it has bought 
several large groups of businesses, some related to its chosen core activities but some 
connected with non-core activities. Devogelaer (2003) reports that, over time, rapid 
expansion of a company's product line destroys its competitive ability. He cites 
Markides (1992b, 1995) who finds that high levels of diversification result in 
inefficiencies in their operations, which may lead to declines in performance. 
Devogelaer (2003) observes that one of the drivers of refocusing is the need to focus 
on core competences. This follows the general belief that during the 1960s and the 
1970s, managers may have acquired assets in business areas unrelated to the core 
business and competences of the firm in order to increase their personal wealth or 
their job security (Marris, 1964; Amihud and Lev, 1981). In his study Devogelaer 
(2003) cites the following studies which asserts that although diversification may 
provide gains for managers, firm value may be destroyed: 
• because of lack of economies of scope or synergistic economies (resulting 
from failure to share or utilise jointly inputs by different parts of the 
company) between unrelated lines of business (Amihud and Lev, 1981); 
• because of possible overpayment in acquisitions (Morck et al. ,1990); and 
• through inefficient investment in, and cross- subsidisation of, the ongoing 
business of the firm (Bhide and Ofek, 1995). 
According to Devogelaer (2003), the firm's choice of an optimal strategy 
depends on a set of firm-specific factors, for example, the firm's technological and 
organisational capabilities as well as a set of characteristics of the selection 
environment. If the competitive pressure in the selection environment becomes 
tougher, as is the case in the hyper-competitive environment, the firm ought to refocus 
to ensure survival. This hyper-competition or intense state of global competition 
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forces holdings companies to concentrate on a few industries where they hold a clear 
global competitive advantage and abandon unprofitable side activities, often taken up 
in the portfolio during times when it was still fashionable to diversify. Lynch (2004) 
reports that the 1980s were a period of intense takeover activity in the United 
Kingdom, with many companies buying a variety of different groups and becoming 
over-geared in the process. High interest rates in the late 1980s started a process of 
unbundling. Ferreira (1997b) in his study cites Davis et al. (1994) who note that by 
the 1990s the conglomerate firm in the United States had become deinstitutionalised. 
They further report not only one third drop in the level of total diversification among 
Fortune 500 firms, but also a 44 percent decline in the level of unrelated 
diversification in the course of the 1980s. These results are supported by Markides 
1993, (in Ferreira 1997b), who finds that at least 20 percent and as many as 50 percent 
of Fortune 500 firms refocused during the period 1981 to 1987. Changes in business 
rhetoric in the 1980s denounced the conglomerate form in favour of the lean, focused 
and networked firm (Davis et al., 1994 in Ferreira, 1997b). 
2.2 Diversification and Unbundling Defined 
Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989 (in Ferreira (1997c) define diversification as 
the entry of a firm or business unit into new lines of activity, either by the process of 
internal business development or acquisition, which entails changes in its 
administrative structure, systems and other management processes. 
In Diversification and divestiture (2002) it was noted that over diversification 
occurs when the marginal cost of diversification, (which are information, control and 
coordination costs, increased shirking, inefficiencies) exceed the marginal benefits of 
diversification (which are usage of asset specific resources, market power advantages, 
tax benefits, reduction of agency problems) (Markides, 1995). While arguing that an 
optimal level of diversification does exist, studies by Makides (1992) and Hoskinson 
et al. (1994) cited in Diversification and Divestiture (2002) maintain that this level is 
firm specific, that is, it is contingent upon the size, environment, organisational 
strategy, uncertainty and technology of every company and is also a dynamic 
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phenomenon - the level of optimum diversification will change over time. Three 
possible explanations of why over diversification happened in the first place are 
suggested. 
i. from agency perspective the different interests of shareholder and managers 
will lead managers to pursue growth which will eventually lead to 
diversification. 
from the institutional perspective diversification could be pursued for 
legitimising reasons in periods when diversification is in vogue that is, is 
appreciated by the market. 
iii. from the temporal dynamics perspective, previous optimal levels of 
diversification could be eroded by environmental and intra-firm changes. 
For example, the advent of information technologies has increased the span 
of managerial control, but the improved efficiency of financial markets has 
undermined the advantages of the corporation as a re-distributor of finance. 
According to Markides (1995b) (in Ferreira, 1997b) it is now accepted in the 
strategy literature that there are benefits as well as cost associated with diversification 
and that the marginal diversification benefits tend to decrease as the firm diversifies 
further away from its core business. 
Ferreira (1999) defines corporate unbundling as referring to the refocusing (or 
large scale reduction in diversification or scope) of a diversified corporation through 
multiple spin offs. Kang and Diltz (2000) assert that unbundling may occur 
voluntarily or involuntarily. Involuntary unbundling, ether in the form of spin-off or a 
sell off is usually ordered by government. Ferreira (1999) defines voluntary as 
referring to unbundling brought about through internal processes (including board of 
directors' governance) rather than as a result of a takeover or legal or regulatory 
requirements. Unbundling because of the possible threat of takeover bids is 
considered to be voluntary. Such unbundling will be considered to be successful if it 
manages to preserve the integrity of the spun-off businesses (that is they are not 
subsequently absorbed by another firm, but continue to compete successfully and 
independently) and if it increases shareholder wealth as compared to the ex ante 
position. According to Moschieri and Mair (2005), the terms divestiture and 
divestment are often used interchangeably to describe an unbundling operation. They 
argue that it is important to distinguish between divestiture or unbundling of business 
units and the divestment of physical assets in order to avoid confusion both at the 
level of theoretical constructs and at the level of empirical research. They further 
report that failure to distinguish between the two phenomena can bias the results of 
empirical studies. 
Divestiture refers to an alteration of the firm's productive portfolio: a firm 
disposes of a division, a business unit, a product line or a subsidiary, offering it on the 
market (Rosenfeld, 1984). Hite and Owers (1983) add that divestiture entails the 
exchange of the productive or operative cash flows associated with the divested assets 
for cash, other operating assets, or securities of the acquire firm. Kang and Diltz 
(2000) note that divestiture may occur voluntarily or involuntarily. Involuntary 
divestitures are usually ordered by the government and voluntary divestitures are 
presumably the outcome of wealth maximisation behaviour on the part of managers 
acting in shareholder interests. 
Divestment according to Moschieri and Mair (2005) is used to refer to the sale 
of parts of a company, be it physical assets or an entire business division, subsidiary 
or product line. They also cite in their study a definition by Capron et al, (2001) 
which describes divestment as the partial or complete sale or disposal of physical and 
organisational assets, shut down of facilities and workforce reduction. Nees 1978 (in 
Moschieri & Mair, 2005, 3) sees divestment as a series of independent steps overtime 
and across the various levels of the organisation as a consequence of discontinuance 
of one of the firm's activities. 
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2.3 Modes of Unbundling 
Unbundling includes sell-offs, spin-offs, spinouts, carve outs, split -offs, split-
ups, leveraged buy-outs and management buy-outs. In each of the divesting modes, 
the parent undergoes an unbundling operation for different reasons and in search of 
different objectives and therefore maintains a relationship with the divested unit 
(Moschieri and Mair, 2005). The reasons and objectives are detailed below: 
Spin off. According to Krisnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), there is neither a 
dilution of equity nor a transfer of ownership from the current shareholders. They 
further observe that spin-offs constitute a unique mode of divesting assets since they 
do not involve and cash transactions. Thus they cannot be motivated by a desire to 
generate cash to pay off debt, as is often the case with other modes of divestures. The 
spin off may be accomplished through a rights offering. Moschieri and Mair (2005) in 
their study cite John (1993) who notes that a spin off may be a method for the parent 
to reduce agency costs and create tax shields and Garvin (1983) who notes that it may 
be a method used to enter a new industry, while retaining a close relationship with the 
spun-off company. 
Carve out/ partial spin off. Allen et al, (1998) (in Moschieri & Mair, 2005) 
emphasise the fact that the parent undertakes a carve-out explicitly in order to raise 
funds in the capital markets: these funds can be retained within the firm or used to pay 
creditors or shareholders. Carve out divisions tend to be high value assets Powers 
(2001). Carve-outs are seen as temporary forms of restructuring and often after some 
time, the parent re-acquires the carved out division or divest it into another mode 
(Klein et al, 1991; Slovan et al, 1995) cited in Moschieri and Mair (2005). 
Distributions in a Split off may be pro-rata or non pro-rata depending on 
whether all shareholders participate in the exchange. In addition, non-pro-rata spin-
offs may be a mandatory exchange pursuant to a majority vote by a particular class of 
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shareholders or a voluntary exchange at the election of the individual shareholders 
through a tender offer from the parent company (Brealey & Meyers, 1996). 
A split-up may involve transfer of property from a parent company to its 
existing or newly created subsidiary companies and then liquidation of the parent 
company through a distribution of the subsidiary companies' stock to the parent's 
shareholders in exchange for all its stock. As such, a split-up is a way to break up a 
company into two or more independent, separate companies (Brealey & Meyers, 
1996). 
A firm engages in a sell-off when it sells a division, business unit, product line 
or subsidiary to another firm in exchange for cash. The sold assets are absorbed by the 
acquiring firm and become part of it (Hearth and Zaima, 1984; Rosenfeld, 1984). 
Sell-offs occur when subsidiaries have poor operating performance, high leverage, are 
highly diversified, and operate in under-performing industries. When compared to 
their parents, the, sell-off divisions are low value assets and operate in industries 
different from the other parent industries (Powers, 2001). After the sell off, the parent 
has no connection with the divested unit (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). 
A leveraged buyout (LBO) is a transaction in which a group of private 
investors uses debt financing to purchase a corporation or a corporate division. The 
principal characteristics of an LBO are high leverage, management ownership, active 
corporate governance and investor's loss of access to liquid public equity markets 
(Palepu, 1990). 
Management buyouts (MBOs) are transactions in which managers, with the 
support of other investors, replace public stockholding of the parent company. MBOs 
are normally financed with large debt issues and the new stocks are normally held by 
incumbent managers and a small group of external investors. MBOs often continue to 
operate significant portions of the original assets (Seth et ah, 1993 in Moschieri and 
Mair, 2005). 
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Moschieri and Mair (2005), find that the decision to choose a sell-off or carve-
out depends on three factors: the characteristics of a business unit (it is worth selling, 
it performs well, it is related to the parent's business, it is related to other parent 
industries); the characteristic of the parent (performance, leverage, need for cash, 
diversification); and the characteristics of the environment (pace of growth and 
performance of industry). Given a need for external finance the decision to chose a 
sell-off or carve out rests on whether the parent firm has something worthwhile to 
sell. Carve out divisions show a better operation performance than their parents and 
are significantly more profitable and faster growing than spin-off divisions which in 
turn are more profitable and faster growing than spin-off divisions, which in turn are 
more profitable and faster growing that sell-off divisions (Powers, 2001). The choice 
between MBO or sell-off or carve out depends on the prospective price. 
Anslinger, Bonini & Patsalos-Fox (2000) note that each type of restructuring 
results in the formation of new equity owned by a fresh set of shareholders who 
demand a degree of accountability from the unbundled entity, which, unlike a 
subsidiary, cushioned within a larger corporation is accountable to a set of 
shareholders not to the parent company's senior management. The accountability 
created by restructuring often improves performance and investors also benefit from 
the greater visibility of the unbundled entities to analysts and the public. Even when a 
unit continues to be governed by it parent's board, as with a tracking stock, the 
existence of a separate set of shareholders means that the cash flow and profitability 
of the unit are distinct from those of its parent. 
2.4 Why Conglomerates Unbundle 
The goal of the firm, and therefore all managers and employees is to maximise 
the wealth of the owners for whom it is being operated. The wealth of corporate 
owners is measured by the share price, which in turn is based on the timing of returns 
(cash flows), their magnitude and their risk. When considering each financial decision 
alternative or possible actions in terms of its impact on the share price of the firm's 
stock, financial managers should accept only those actions that are expected to 
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increase share price (Gitman, 1994). The following reasons why conglomerate 
unbundled were gathered from a review of related studies. 
2.4.1 A Reaction to an Error of Judgement by Management 
Moschieri and Mair (2005) cite previous work on strategy by Porter (1987) that 
portrayed unbundling as a reaction to an error of judgement by management at the 
time of the original acquisition or as a readjustment of the company's business focus 
in order to increase its economic value and competitive position. They also cite 
Hayes (1972) who following this line of thinking described divestures as the inverse 
of acquisition, suggesting that a firm will make up for an unsuccessful acquisition by 
simply reversing the purchase; that is disposing of the acquired business. McGahan et 
al. (2003b) (in Moschieri and Mair 2005) suggest that mergers and acquisitions are 
not the inverse of divestures but strategic alternatives. 
2.4.2 Shareholder Wealth Maximisation 
According to Ferreira (1997a), the factors that have driven the shift in corporate 
orientation include the need for shareholder wealth maximisation, performance related 
problems due to either inefficient internal governance mechanisms or to mistakes in 
strategy formulation (leading to over diversification), and new competitive demands. 
2.4.3 Elimination of Negative Synergies or Diseconomies of Scale 
Kirchmaier (2003) suggests that a de-merger is a sensible option if negative 
synergies or diseconomies of scale exist that can be eliminated by separating the firm 
into two or more independent entities. The possible explanations for such a value 
creation are: 
Dismantling of conglomerates. Historically unbundling was used to dismantle 
conglomerates after it became apparent that the costs of running such organisation 
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structures outweighed the benefits. The dismantling of conglomerates argument is 
widely based on the idea of removing inefficient organisational structures and hence 
the elimination of negative synergies. 
Organisational improvements. From an organisational perspective, value can be 
created through the elimination of misfits in the strategic focus or organisational 
properties of the organisation. The reduction of the size of an organisation leads to an 
over proportional reduction in information loss within the hierarchy. 
Capital market improvements. More focused units might improve access to the 
capital market or attract a new set of investors, thereby eliminating barriers to growth 
from a capital market perspective. 
Corporate governance improvements. Value creation through improvements in 
the role and function of the head office, improvements in the structuring of 
managerial incentives and more effective market based governance mechanisms due 
to increased transparency. 
Bondholder expropriation. Value redistribution from bondholders to 
shareholders through a reduction of quality of the collateral provided (Hite & Owers, 
1983). 
2.4.4 No Synergies between the Parent and the Subsidiary 
Hite and Owers (1983) state that if there are no synergies between the parent 
and the subsidiary, the sum of the post-divesture cash flows would equal the 
combined cash flow had the two units remained as one. The value of two business 
units should be identical before and after unbundling, unless some positive or 
negative synergies exist that create or destroy value under a combined ownership 
structure. For example the synergies and mutual interdependence, on which ICI had 
always assumed that its success depended, existed almost entirely within each of the 
clusters but not across them (Owen & Harrison, 1995). Hite and Owers (1983), 
Schipper and Smith (1983), Daley et al., (1997) and Desai and Jain (1999) argue that 
gains from spin-offs could arise from the improvement in focus and elimination of 
negative synergies between the parent and the subsidiary. Consistent with the focus 
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argument Daley et al (1997) Desai and Jain (1999) document a significant 
improvement in operating performance in the year after the event, for spin-offs that 
separate divisions that operate in different industries. In a similar vein, Schipper and 
Smith (1983) find that over one third of their sample involves separation of dissimilar 
units. Hite and Owers (1983) classify firms based on the reasons given by the firm for 
the spin-off and find that the sub-sample where the motivation was improvement in 
focus, exhibits the largest abnormal returns in the period 50 days prior to the 
announcement to the completion date of the spin-off. 
2.4.5 Elimination of Managerial Diseconomies of Scale 
Diversification and Divestiture (2002) asserts that unbundling will cut off 
managerial diseconomies of scale, enable the managers to concentrate on core 
competences, thus making the business more efficient. He cites Hill and Hoskisson 
(1987) who view the managerial span of corporate control as a decreasing function of 
the information processing requirements, which affects realised economic gains. 
Unbundling frees managerial, administrative and financial resources to concentrate on 
strategic projects, it increases the firm-specific risk (compared to a diversified 
company which is considered to be less risky) thus aligning the company's actions 
with the interests of the shareholders according to the agency perspective and 
decreases transaction costs in the form of administrative and managerial burden. He 
also cites Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) who find that highly diversified firms 
invest less in innovation than less diversified firms. 
2.4.6 Geographical Focus 
Veld and Merkoulova (2003) state that firstly, the reduced complexity of the 
firm may lower monitoring and coordinating costs. Secondly, the managers might 
have chosen to globally diversify in order to reduce their own risks even if it results in 
lower shareholder value. Third, the possibility of cross subsidisation of less efficient 
divisions is reduced. 
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2.4.7 Legal, Market and Strategy Origins 
Moschieri and Mair (2005) propose the segmentation of unbundling into three 
different origins: legal, market and strategy origins. From a legal perspective, 
divestures can be categorised as either voluntary or involuntary (Montgomery et al. 
1984) a company may voluntarily decide to divest part of its business for strategic, 
financial or organisational reasons. An involuntary divesture by contrast is normally a 
reaction to legal and/or regulatory difficulties (Hite & Owers, 1983; Montegomery et 
al. 1984; Vijh, 2002). An involuntary divestiture is a reaction to legal and /or 
regulatory limitations. For example in recent years, many public European companies 
we denationalised and had to involuntary divest part of their operations to comply 
with European Commission competition regulations Mair and Moschieri (2006). 
Their second origin, the market perspective, Moschieri and Mair (2005) propose 
a distinction between defensive and aggressive reasons. In their study they cite 
Hopkin (1991) who tests the 'defensive response' explanation of the link between 
acquisition and divesture. He claims that acquisition can be a defensive reaction to 
weak or deteriorating industry conditions and competitive position, and that the 
attractiveness and concentration of the firm's home industry are positively related to 
unbundling decisions. Moschieri and Mair (2005) cite in their study, Duhaime and 
Bird (1987) who find that the reasons behind divesting decisions are aggressive for 
medium sized units and defensive for small and large units. 
Their third origin, the strategic perspective suggests that firms decide to divest 
for either corrective or proactive reasons. Moschieri and Mair (2005) also cite various 
studies that contribute to their strategic perspective highlighted below. 
• Corrective divestures are intended to make up for previous strategic mistakes 
(Hittef a/. 1996; Porter, 1987) 
• to reduce over diversification (Hoskisson et al., 1994; Markides, 1992a), 
• to re focus on core businesses (Markides, 1992a; Seith et al., 1993), 
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• to realign corporate strategy with the firm's identity (Mitchell, 1994; 
Zuckerman, 2000), 
• to react to an industry-level competition (Aron, 1991), 
• to eliminate negative synergies (Linn and Rozff, 1985; Miles and Rosenfeld, 
1983; Rosenfeld, 1984) or 
• to resolve organisational issues such as bad governance (Hoskisson et al., 
1994). 
They further cite (Brown et al. 1999; Hitt et al. 1996) who assert that the purpose of 
proactive divestures is to restructure the company's asset portfolio by routinely 
redesigning, splitting, transferring or exiting businesses to adapt to changing market 
opportunities (Eisenhart et al. 1999; Sigelkow, 2002). This re-configuration process is 
aimed at 
• designing a more efficient governance form (Seward et al, 1996) 
• improving performance and profitability (Fluck and Lynch, 1999; Haynes et 
al., 2002; Mitchell, 1994; Woo et al., 1992), 
• obtaining new cash flows (Hitt et al., 1996; Jensen, 1989), 
• reducing high levels of debt (Allen and McConnell, 1998; Hitt et al, 1996; 
Montgomery et al., 1984) or tax payments (John, 1993; Schipper et al, 1986; 
Woo era/., 1992), or 
• improving corporate innovativeness and entrepreneurship (Cassiman & Ueda, 
2004; Garvin, 1983). 
2.4.8 Mitigation of Information Asymmetry 
Krisnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that practitioners and the popular 
press propose reduction in information asymmetry as a motivation for spin offs. For 
instance, they note that the CEOs of most firms involved in spin-offs claim that the 
spin-offs improve the firm's market value because investors are able to perceive value 
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more clearly after the spin off. The CEOs argue that as separate entities, the 
consequences of a temporary decline in the performance of one entity does not spill 
over and adversely affect another. In their study they give an example of Robert Allen 
the Chairman of AT&T who while discussing the motivation behind their spin-off 
decision claimed that the market value of AT&T was buried. Investors could not 
understand the strategy of the combined firm, after the spin off AT&T would be the 
biggest pure play in telecommunication. Investors will clearly understand AT&T. 
The information related argument for divestitures is formally developed in 
Nanda and Narayanan (1997) through a model of asymmetric information about the 
firm's value between the managers of the firm and the market. They assume that the 
market can observe the aggregate cash flows of the firm but not the individual 
divisional cash flows. This results in the mis-valuation of the firm's securities. The 
authors develop an equilibrium where, if a firm requires external capital to finance 
growth opportunities then an undervalued firm will resort to raising capital either 
through a divestiture or after a divestiture while an overvalued firm will resort to an 
equity issue without separating its divisions. In the context of spin-offs, since the 
divestiture does not generate cash inflows to the firm, undervalued firms requiring 
capital would first engage in a spin-off to attain fair market value for their shares and 
then issue equity to raise capital. Krisnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) report that a 
spin-off is followed by a detailed disclosure of all the individual profit and cost 
information of the separated divisions. After the spin-off the shares trade separately 
and are tracked by different analysts. These changes obviate the need for an 
estimation of important division-specific cost and profit information from 
consolidated financial statements. If poor performance by one division had adversely 
affected the value of other more efficient and profitable divisions, then a spin-off 
would eliminate the under valuation. Such correction of valuation would be especially 
important for the firms that in the near future expect to raise external capital to 
finance their growth opportunities. 
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On the other hand, according to Krisnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), an 
ordinary disclosure of this information by a combined firm without separating the 
divisions will not be credible because the firm can manipulate the shared costs, that 
are unobservable by the market, across divisions to maximise on the proceeds from 
the new security issue. A spin-off however separates the operations and the assets. 
2.4.9 Taxes 
In the United States some spin offs are taxable. Empirical research by Copeland 
et al. (1987) and Krisnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) shows that taxable spin offs 
are associated with lower positive abnormal returns than non-taxable spin-offs. Spin 
offs in European countries generally do not create tax problems because it is possible 
to defer tax payments. 
2.4.10 Non-Market Factors 
Anslinger et al. (2000) examines non-market factors that might signal a need to 
restructure which are outlined below. 
A failure to attract highfliers. The best people might want to work only for 
businesses that dominate their preferred fields. This problem, which afflicts many 
conglomerates, can out-weigh the synergies that a diverse group of businesses may 
seem to offer. 
Mismatched business models. Anslinger et al. (2000) cites an example in which 
after buying Unigraphics (a CAD/CAM software business) from McDonell Douglas 
in 1991, EDS realised that its new subsidiary was operating on the basis of a software 
business model different from its own. A few years later EDS carved out Unigraphics. 
22 
More efficient decision making. The headquarters people who make capital 
budgeting decisions depend on the often-inflated representations of division managers 
in a way that capital markets almost never do. By spinning off a division, a parent 
hands this problem to the market. 
Cannot keep up with the Joneses. Senior management sometimes neglect 
business units or factions because they are not as efficient or value creating as their 
independent counterparts. These too can be good candidates for carve outs. 
Subsidiary needs wings to grow. Because the health care information industry 
was consolidating, AMBAC, a financial-service firm saw that its subsidiary, HCIA 
would have to grow larger. AMBAC did not want to make any acquisitions itself, 
however, since the gap between its stock's multiple and that of the typical health care 
information provider made any such transaction highly dilutive. So it carved-out 
HCIA in the expectation that its stock would achieve a higher price-to-earnings ratio, 
making it a more powerful currency with which to finance the acquisition of another 
provider. 
Incentives and team structure. Another reason for restructuring is the desire to 
motivate management, not only with new strategy, but also with equity-based 
incentives. When Case Corporation was carved out of Tenneco in June 1994, Tenneco 
gave Case's top management options representing 1.8 percent (worth $9.8 million) of 
Case's outstanding shares as part of the long-term incentive plan. By the end of 1996 
the top five executives had pushed up the stock price so far that their compensation 
reached $70 million. 
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2.5 Requirements for Successful Unbundling Process 
Anslinger et al. (2000) finds that separating a business from its parent can create 
a strategic conundrum so it is advisable for a subsidiary to define its strategic focus 
before a restructuring. To give Vastar space to grow, ARCO decided to focus its 
business units on international opportunities and let Vastar concentrate on the United 
States. Although the strategies of a parent and its former subsidiary may be separate, 
their activities may remain entangled. In cases where each party sells goods and 
services to the other, for example, pricing these transfers becomes the most critical 
issue in the relations between the two companies. Prices must be set at levels that are 
fair to each party and its shareholders. If the level of interaction is high because 
technologies, services and brands are shared, these agreements can become so 
complicated that there may be little value in separating. 
2.6 Findings from Studies 
The first empirical paper on unbundling was published by Miles and Rosefeld 
(1983), analysing announcement effects of 55 de-mergers/ spin-offs between 1963 
and 1980. Analysing a time period ranging from 120 trading days before to 60 days 
after, the de-merger announcement, they found a statistically significant cumulative 
average adjusted return of 22%. 
Schipper and Smith (1983) studied 93 voluntary de-merger announcements 
between 1963 and 1981. Using a market model (CAPM) they established a significant 
positive announcement effect of approximately +2.8% for a two-day announcement 
period. They also noted that most spun off subsidiaries (72 out of the 93 firms) were 
operating in dissimilar industries to the parent firm. For 18 out of the 93 transactions, 
regulatory pressure was the reported prime motive. The market rewarded those 
transactions with an average abnormal return of+5.07% compared with +2.29% for 
the remainder of the sample. 
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Hite and Owers (1983) studied the security price reactions of 123 voluntary de-
mergers between 1963 and 1981 and established statistically significant positive 
cumulative abnormal returns of+7% for the period ranging from 50 days prior to the 
announcement through to the completion date. Of this +3.3% took place in the two-
day period from day-1 to day 0. 
Copeland, Lemgruber & Mayers (1987) extended the above research by 
comparing two different samples. The first sample with no post-selection bias 
included all firms that had announced a de-merger decision; the second sample 
suffering from a post selection bias only contained firms that both announced and 
executed the de-merger. Copeland et al. (1987) established that the two-day abnormal 
return for the fixed sample is +3.03% where as for the rebalanced sample it was 
+2.49%). In addition he established that about 11% of all firms never executed their 
announced de-mergers, a result that is roughly in line with the findings of the study 
done by Kirchmaier (2003). These results are based on a sample of de-merges that 
occurred between 1962 and 1983. 
Cusatis et al. (1993) analysed the performance of a sample of 146 de-megers 
taking place between 1965 and 1988 and analysed a much longer time period ranging 
from six months to three years following the execution date of the de-merger. 
Announcement effects were excluded from the research. Their research indicates that 
both the spin-off and their parents offer significantly positive abnormal returns for up 
to three years beyond the spin-ff announcement date. 
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Table 2.1: Event Studies Analysing Spin-Offs 
Author(s) 
Miles and Rosenfeld 
Schipper and Smith 
Hite and Owers 
Copeland et al. 











































Adapted from Vroom and Frderikslust (1999: 1) 
Krisnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), analyse the information hypothesis that 
a spin-off is value enhancing because it mitigates information asymmetry in the 
market about the profitability and operating efficiency of the different divisions of the 
firm, consistent with the premise of information hypothesis they find that firms that 
engage in spin offs, have higher levels of information asymmetry about their value 
than their industry and size matched counterparts. They also find that for firms that 
engage in spin-offs, all five measures of information asymmetry decrease 
substantially after the completion of the spin-off, which is consistent with the view 
that a spin-off mitigates information problems. 
According to Krisnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) there are several testable 
implications of the information hypothesis. Firstly firms that engage in spin-offs 
should have higher levels of information asymmetry about their value compared to 
other firms. Secondly, in equilibrium since only undervalued firms engage in spin-
offs (Nanda and Narayanan, 1997) the abnormal returns at the spin-off announcement 
should be positive. A third implication is that if information asymmetry results in 
under-valuation, then the wealth gains from a spin-off should be positively related to 
the level of information asymmetry about the firm. Further by devastating the 
divisions thorough a spin-off, the individual divisions operating costs and efficiency 
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are revealed to the market. Thus the information hypothesis not only predicts a 
positive share price reaction, but also predicts that the level of information asymmetry 
will decrease for these firms after the completion of the spin-off. Also since firms 
with different divisions operating within the same industry are likely to have little 
negative synergies between divisions, when these firms undertake a spin-off it is 
expected that information asymmetry is a more important reason for the share holder 
gains from the spin-off. 
Habib et al. (1997) also present an information-based explanation for spin-offs. 
They derive a model in which a firm can increase its value by spinning off a 
subsidiary. The spin off will lead to an increase in the number of shares that are traded 
on the market. This makes the price system more informative and hence leads to a 
decrease in information asymmetry. This decrease in information asymmetry will lead 
to and increase in the total value of the firm and its spun-off subsidiary. 
Ovtchinnikov (2003) analyses the long run stock price performance on spin-off 
and their parents following spin-offs by employing a comprehensive sample of spin-
offs that covers 36 years of data. Ovtchinnikov (2003) finds that for both subsidiary 
and parent companies, both mean and median excess returns are positive for almost 
every holding period and time interval considered. According to Ovtchinnikov (2003) 
the popular press drawing on earlier academic studies, has issued numerous 
recommendations to investors on how to beat the market by investing in spin-offs, 
(Sewer 1992, Michels & Neumeiner, 1994, Gutner, 1996, Hayes, 1887, Siwolop, 
1997 and Sivy, 1996). Commentators urge investors to avoid purchasing spun off 
companies in the first six months following the initial listing date because of 
significant downside risk associated with many institutional clients rebalancing their 
portfolios immediately following the spin-offs. Contrary to this recommendation, 
Ovtchinnikov (2003), shows that excess returns for subsidiaries tend to the highest 
over the first 6 to 12 months following the event. Thus had an investor followed a 
strategy of buying and holding recently spun-off subsidiaries as recommended in the 
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popular press, he would have missed much of the gains associated with investing in 
spin-offs. 
Veld and Merkoulova (2003) in their study of announcement effects and long 
run performance for a sample of 156 European spin-offs announced between January 
1987 and September 200, find that the announcement of completed spin-off is 
associated with a positive abnormal return of 2.66% over a three day window. They 
also find no relationship between the abnormal returns and the level of information 
asymmetry at the time of the spin off. In line with the efficient market hypothesis, 
they do not find any significant long run excess return in the period after the spin off. 
They conclude that the capital markets in Europe efficiently react to information 
contained in the spin-off announcements. 
Thaler and Lamont (2001) studied a sample of equity carve outs in which the 
parent firm explicitly states its intention to immediately spin off its remaining 
ownership in the subsidiary. The sample contains 18 issues from April 1996 to August 
2000. The sample consist of every carve-out of less than 20% of the subsidiary's 
shares in which the parent declared its intention to distribute the remaining shares. 
The study particularly concentrated on the stub value of the company, which is the 
value of subsidiary shares to be given to parent shareholders at the distribution date. 
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(Source: Thaler and Lamont, 2001: 44) 
The table indicates nine positive stubs and six negative stubs and three marginal 
cases. With the positive stub, it implies that the market has recognised the more that 
full value of the company's stock in the parent company, indicating value creation on 
the part of the original shareholder in the parent stock. This incidence of value 
creation occurred at least 50% of the time immediately after the initial public offering. 
2.7 An Overview of Some Companies that Unbundled 
Examples of corporate restructure include the unbundling of the British giant 
ICI in 1993 (Owen & Harrison, 1995) and Gencor in South Africa in 1993 (Gleason 
& Levin, 1999). 
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2.7.1 ICI Unbundling 
Background 
Owen and Harrison (1995) report in 1926 when four leading British companies 
came together with government encouragement to form Imperial Chemical Industries, 
the explicit goal was to counter the might of German's IG Farben and to establish a 
British-owned company in the front rank of the world chemical industry. They also 
report that that during 1980s ICI sought new sources of growth to offset the sluggish 
sales of its older products but in the end only increased the complexity of an already 
complicated and hard to manage portfolio of businesses. Changes in the market and 
technologies had overtaken the logic that held the component businesses together and 
bound them to the corporate parent. The parenting skills on which ICI's earlier 
success had been based were no longer appropriate. The stock price of the ICI, failed 
to reflect the value of many of its businesses, and a takeover threatened the company 
in 1991. 
Reasons for unbundling 
According to Owen and Harrison (1995) ICI's businesses could be grouped into 
two technological clusters. The synergies and mutual interdependence, on which ICI 
had always assumed that its success depended, existed almost entirely within each of 
the clusters but not across them. Each cluster faced different strategic priorities and 
required different technical capabilities and managerial skills. In trying to control and 
direct two such disparate sets of businesses, ICI was failing to help either. Each 
cluster of businesses needed its own style of parenting, which the existing 
organisation was not equipped to provide. In 1992, ICI spun off its pharmaceuticals, 
agrochemicals, and speciality chemicals into a second company called Zeneca. 
Results of the unbundling process 
Each of the two companies is a far better parent to its portion of the old ICI 
portfolio of businesses than the corporation had been to the whole 
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2.7.2 Gencor's Unbundling 
Background 
Gleason and Levin, 1999, in their report on Gencor's unbundling, highlight that 
Gencor was used to foster Afrikaner aspirations of ownership in mining. 
Reasons for unbundling 
In 1993, Gencor decided to concentrate on its mining core. That meant it would 
divest in favour of shareholders substantial holdings in a variety of industrial and 
natural resources investments. Among those were Sappi (38.6%), Engen (49.9%), 
Genbel (49.9%) and Malbak (49%). All of these businesses continue to be major 
entities. 
Results of unbundling 
In the space of five years, Gencor has gone from its role as a massive industrial 
and mining conglomerate to a narrower focus as a mining house with interest in gold 
and platinum and finally to an investment house. 
2.8 Advantages of Unbundling 
Fidelity Life Asset Management (2003) observes that one of the major trends 
that have been on offer is the unbundling of subsidiaries and their subsequent listing 
separately on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. The advantages of unbundling divisions 
and listing them separately include the following: 
• Unlocking shareholders' values 
• Enhance management of smaller units since normally as the organisation 
grows, managerial diseconomies of scale tend to curve in resulting in 
difficulty in managing the organisation as a whole. 
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• It provides an additional investment opportunity for the existing shareholders 
to participate on separately listed companies. 
• As a result of management focus there will be improved efficiency and 
productivity on the unbundled division. 
• Raising of capital would become easier and often less costly for each division. 
Benza (2003), notes that: 
• After unbundling the respective performance of both businesses will be more 
visible 
• Unbundling also allows for a separation of investment decisions through 
flexible portfolio management. 
• A clear-cut focus on individual businesses will help investors take exposure 
based on his or her understanding of the industry as well as risk appetite. 
• Furthermore, unbundling increases performance pressure by individually 
highlighting the performance of the two businesses and applying capital 
market controls to each of them. 
Owen and Harrison (1995) find that: 
• The new structure aligns corporate objectives much more closely with those of 
the individual businesses. 
• Unbundling separates distinct sets of problems or opportunities and assigns 
them to corporate parents more motivated to deal with them. 
2.9 Disadvantages of Unbundling 
Owen and Harrison (1995) also highlight a disadvantage arising from 
unbundling, that the separation of businesses that had been united for years 
involves transitional pain, as the separate businesses no longer have access to skill 
in the other businesses. They find that the links are at the margin of the business 
clusters and business managers can find replacements for their loss without 
difficulty or cost. 
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2.10 Unbundling in Zimbabwe 
The international studies reviewed above indicate that unbundling is a viable 
strategic decision. Several studies report positive shareholder returns for unbundled 
entities and their parent companies. However, one could argue whether spin-offs 
really create value in the long run or whether results of studies in US and Europe were 
a consequence of chance. Fama (1998) argues that the performance in the US was 
more a consequence of chance. He argues that those studies finding significant long 
run returns receive more attention in the academic and popular literature because they 
are more interesting and nothing else. For this reason it is important to study 
unbundling outside the United States and Europe and hence the decision to focus on 
the unbundling of listed companies in Zimbabwe. 
2.10.1 Mode of Unbundling in Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe, unbundling is in the form of a spin-off and the term used is 
'distribution in specie'. The restructuring involves a pro-rata distribution of shares of 
the newly formed corporate entity to shareholders of the original company. 
Shareholders become owners of two separate companies; the original company that is 
maintained and the spin-off entity (http://www.zse.co.zw). Unbundling in Zimbabwe 
was sparked off by the unbundling of the Delta Group in 2001. Since then, a total of 
nine listed companies unbundled and seven of these had their unbundled entities 
subsequently listed on the ZSE (http://www.zse.co.zw). 
2.10.2 Media Report on Unbundling 
Theory and empirical evidence from international studies lends support for the 
claim of increased corporate unbundling in Zimbabwe, that is, unlocking of 
shareholder value and improvement in performance. It is not known whether 
unbundling is a viable strategic decision for listed companies in Zimbabwe. Since 
2001, when the unbundling process started in Zimbabwe, there has been an increase 
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in media reports about unbundling of both listed and unlisted companies in Zimbabwe 
as highlighted in the reports cited below. Benza (2003, p B4) notes that, "In today's 
fiercely competitive global market landscape where factors such as business cycles, 
economics and investment requirements determine the fate of a business entity, 
companies the world over are coming up with various strategies to stay afloat. One 
such strategy is the separation of core and non-core activities as firms seek to 
concentrate more on what they can do best while peripheral business is either sold off 
or just separated from the main business. But the question still remains, does the 
unbundling increase shareholder value?" Benza (2003) further notes that proponents 
of the unbundling strategy in Zimbabwe say that the perception about total risk of an 
overall business does lead to lower valuation of the company's stock. In some cases a 
company despite having good peripheral businesses, could be accorded lower 
valuations on account of a negative sentiment on its mainline business by the market 
while ignoring the prospects of its non-core activities. In contrast it is said that a 
specific business focus leads to greater growth potential in future which will unlock 
shareholder value. 
Staff Reporter (2002) reports the intention for Zimre to de-merge and list 
Fidelity Life separately. He cites market observers who said that the de-merger of 
Fidelity life was in line with plans by Zimre to restructure and operate as a holding 
company running life assurance and short-term insurance businesses separately. The 
Staff Reporter also notes that the de-merger will enhance shareholder value and the 
shareholders will be able to assess the contributions of the separately listed Fidelity 
life to Zimre. Benza (2003) reports that the indications on the ZSE so far suggest that 
the separation strategy has worked to the advantage of corporates in their drive to 
bring about focus in their operations. Initial response from the capital markets too 
have vindicated the fact that unbundling have the desired effect on the share prices of 
the entities going under this separation process. 
Staff Reporter (2002) reports that after shedding off OK, Zimsun and Pelham's, 
Delta's core beverage business has grown tremendously as shown in the results for 
the six-month period to 30 September 2002. He further notes that after the de-merger, 
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Delta's core operations in the beverages sector has produced a set of good results with 
a turnover growth of 210% and basic EPS went up 459%. 
2.10.3 Empirical Studies in Zimbabwe 
Studies have been conducted on unbundling in Zimbabwe by Nyandoro (2004), 
Senderayi (2004) and Gonde (2003). However these studies focused on the 
unbundling of companies not listed on the ZSE making it difficult to conclude that 
their findings apply to companies that have unbundled and are listed on the ZSE. This 
study seeks to determine whether the unbundling of companies listed on the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange has resulted in the maximisation of shareholder wealth 
and an improvement in the performance of the unbundled entities. 
Nyandoro (2004) studies the operational effectiveness of a particular unbundled 
strategic business unit of a Parastatal company ZESA. His study focuses on the 
business effectiveness prior to unbundling and after. Effectiveness in his context 
being timeous execution of business plans and being able to satisfy stakeholders. He 
finds that unbundling has very little positive impact on processes. This was reflected 
by the low scores obtained by all indicators under study, where none scored above the 
average. He notes marginal benefits of unbundling on two aspects: the improvement 
in the accuracy of processing and the enhancement of business acumen company-
wide. He further notes that the marginal benefits are not significant as the mean scores 
are below average. 
Senderayi (2004) studies organisational change management in ZESA in the 
form of unbundling of Projects Business Unit has achieved the desired level of 
organisational effectiveness and efficiency. His study mainly focuses on the effects of 
change management rather than unbundling on organisational effectiveness and his 
findings are in line with the focus of his study. 
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2.10.4 Problems Associated with Unbundling in Zimbabwe 
Though studies conducted in Zimbabwe for unlisted companies indicate that the 
unbundling did not bring about significant benefits, unbundling policy is being 
pursued as highlighted in the media. In his studies Nyandoro (2004) reports that 
unbundling is a useless exercise imposed selfishly by management and that 
unbundling is a foreign concept, which cannot work in Zimbabwe. Other concerns 
associated with unbundling relate to issues such as the treatment of operational costs, 
distribution of financial assets, transfer of debt obligation and loss of identity which if 
not addressed well will result in the failure of the unbundling process. 
2.10.5 Research Questions 
A number of questions have emerged from this literature review. This study 
seeks to answer the following questions and hopes to help investors better understand 
the process of unbundling and its benefits in Zimbabwe: 
• What were the most significant drivers behind the decisions to unbundle in 
Zimbabwe? 
• Were the initially stated objectives of the unbundled companies achieved? 
• Is there a relationship between unbundling and an increase in share price? 
• Are positive shareholder returns experienced before, at the time of unbundling 
or after? 
• Did unbundling result in improved performance of the unbundled companies? 
• Is unbundling a viable strategy for companies listed on the ZSE? 
2.11 Conclusion 
It is apparent that the trend in the United States and Europe is towards 
unbundling with a view to unlocking shareholder value. The studies reviewed 
demonstrate the ways in which value is achieved after unbundling. Several studies 
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report positive shareholder returns for unbundled entities and their parent companies 
for up to three years following unbundling. Cusatis et al., (1993), Daley et ai, (1997) 
and Desai and Jain, (1999) among others find evidence of positive long run abnormal 
returns. 
Theory and empirical evidence lends support for the claim of increased 
corporate unbundling in Zimbabwe, that is, unlocking of shareholder value and 
improvement in performance. Since 2001, when the unbundling process started in 
Zimbabwe, there has been an increase in media reports about unbundling of both 
listed and unlisted companies in Zimbabwe. Studies have also been conducted on 
unbundling in Zimbabwe. However these studies focused on the unbundling of 
unlisted companies making it difficult to conclude that their findings apply to 
companies that have unbundled and are listed on the ZSE. This study seeks to 
determine whether unbundling is a viable strategy for companies listed on the ZSE. 
This will be achieved through answering critical research questions that emerged from 
the literature review. 
Chapter Three presents the research methodology. The chapter discusses the 
data types, and quantitative research design. A discussion of the data collection 
methods, ethical requirements and the link between questionnaire, research questions 
and nature and form of results follows. The chapter ends with a discussion of the 





The study uses quantitative techniques to analyse the performance effects of 
unbundling. Quantitative techniques help to address the research objectives and 
answer the research questions developed in Chapter One. By employing this 
technique, the study seeks to come up with answers on what the most significant 
drivers behind the decisions to unbundle were, whether the initially stated objectives 
of the unbundled companies were achieved, to determine if there is a relationship 
between unbundling and an increase in share price and whether positive shareholder 
returns are experienced before, at the time of unbundling or after. The answers to 
these questions were used to determine whether unbundling is a viable strategy for 
companies listed on the ZSE. 
Unbundling affects the performance of the unbundled entity and of the parent 
company. The total economic effect of unbundling is captured by changes in the stock 
market price of the company and by its operating profit. Analysis of economic 
performance of the divesting parent and the spin-off uses market-based measures and 
accounting based measures (Moschieri & Mair, 2005). This study involved the review 
of existing secondary data on listed companies that have unbundled. Data on the 
performance (share prices) of the parent company and the unbundled entities and a 
market index was obtained from the ZSE. Field research was also carried out to 
address most of the theoretical issues on the performance effects of unbundling in 
Zimbabwe. 
This chapter is organised as follows; firstly the types of data used in the study 
are discussed. Secondly, the scaling techniques used are outlined. Thirdly, the chapter 
outlines the design and analytic techniques (that is, quantitative). The quantitative 
design outlines the methods for measuring the returns before, on unbundling and after 
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unbundling. The design also outlines the data collection method, types of questions as 
well as the population and sample size. The chapter then outlines the ethical 
requirements. Lastly, the chapter then outlines how data will be analysed, the nature 
and form of results, the strengths and limitations of the methods used and a 
conclusion. 
3.2 Data Types 
This study involved the collection of quantitative data. The quantitative data 
used in this study comprises of the share prices obtained from the ZSE and data 
obtained through the questionnaire administered to the financial executives of the 
parent company and the spin-off and stockbrokers with most of the question responses 
classified using the Likert scale. The study uses the Likert Scale to evaluate 
statements about the subject under study. According to Dillon et al, (1994), the Likert 
Scale consists of a number of evaluative statements concerning an attitude/object. 
Dillon et al, 1994 note that an even number of favourable and unfavourable 
statements should be used as this reduces the likelihood of acquiescence bias (the 
tendency to agree or disagree with a set of questions), which is more likely if all of the 
statements are in the same direction. They further note that scale items selected should 
possess three qualities: 
• they should capture all relevant aspects of the attitude/object, 
• they should be unambiguous, and 
• they should be sensitive enough to discriminate among respondents with 
respect to the attitude/object under investigation. 
3.3 Research Design 
The research design used in this study is quantitative. Quantitative techniques in 
the form of market based and accounting based measures were applied to measure the 
performance effects of unbundling. 
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3.3.1 Sample and Sampling Techniques 
The sample consists of spin-offs undertaken between January 2000 and 
December 2005. The starting and ending points for the sample period were dictated 
by data availability. No spin-offs were identified prior to January 2000. No spin offs 
after December 2005 were included in the sample because at the time of the analysis 
those spin-offs have less than one full year of post spin-off data on the ZSE. 
The relevant population is composed of all the nine listed companies that have 
unbundled in Zimbabwe. The sample frame is composed of seven listed companies 
that have unbundled and whose unbundled entities were subsequently listed on the 
ZSE. All seven companies and their unbundled entities were studied because they 
were presumably representative of the population of interest and met the specific 
needs of the research study. In total sixteen companies emerged from the seven listed 
companies and all sixteen companies were studied. 
3.3.2 Market Based Measures 
The performance effects of unbundling were determined through the use of a 
market adjusted return model and value uplift analysis. 
3.3.2.1 Market Adjusted Return Model 
Based on the market adjusted return model, the performance of the individual 
stock is compared to the performance of the overall market index hence daily 
abnormal returns (Aj,t) are calculated for each individual security i at time t as 
follows: 
Aj,t =Ri,t - Rm,t 
Where Rit is the actual return of the security i on day t, and Rm,t is the return on the 
market index on day t. in the second stage the abnormal returns are accumulated for 
each firm in the sample over the investigation period (CRj) and then averaged across 
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all firms in the sample. Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated as 
follows: 
N T 
CAR =J. ICR, where CR =£Aj t 
N i = i t=o/i ' 
N denotes the number of firms in the sample 
CRj= the cumulative abnormal return of firm i, 
(Source: Kirchmaier 2003 p 8). 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CRj) are calculated starting at day 0. This calculation 
method is based on a buy and hold investment strategy to void the bias associated 
with portfolio rebalancing (Kirchmaier 2003). To ensure comparability of returns 
(share price movements) over the 3-year period in view of the hyper-inflationary 
economic situation in Zimbabwe where inflation reached levels of 585.8% for 
December 2005 (Central Statistical Office, 2006), all figures were discounted to 
December 2005 real dollars. This is in compliance with International Accounting 
Standard 29 (IAS 29) on accounting for hyper-inflationary economies. Guidelines 
provided by the Zimbabwe Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAZ) were used to 
make the inflation adjustments. Discounting was done using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) figures obtained from the ICAZ website 
http:www.icaz.org.zw/CPI/cpi.htm. The '1995=100 Base at all items level' were used. 
3.3.2.2 Value Uplift 
The value of shareholding before unbundling, and value of holding after 
unbundling in the emerging companies was determined. This was compared to the 
value uplift of the market index on and after unbundling. 
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3.3.3 Accounting Based Measures 
The performance effects of unbundling in Zimbabwe were also determined 
through the questionnaire. 
3.3.3.1 Questionnaire 
The mail survey was used for data collection. Data was obtained through the 
use of a questionnaire. Questionnaires were hand-delivered, emailed or posted to the 
respondents. Questionnaires were used instead of interviews in order to minimise cost 
and avoid biased results, which may grow out of three types of errors: sampling error, 
non-response error, and response error. Telephone calls were made to the financial 
executives of the parent and spin-off companies and stockbrokers, the intended 
respondents to request their permission to participate in the study and to advise that a 
questionnaire would be delivered, e-mailed or posted. This made it possible to obtain 
some of the respondents' names and thus personalise the cover letters accompanying 
the questionnaire. The preliminary telephone calls helped ensure a high response rate 
as some respondents opted to complete and return the questionnaire at the time of 
delivery. Personal delivery of questionnaires overcame the problem of inaccurate 
mailing lists. Where the intended respondent company had moved offices the new 
address was obtained. Self-addressed return envelopes were attached to the 
questionnaires to simplify questionnaire return. Follow-ups were made by telephone 
and email and this helped improve the response rate. 
Mail surveys are less costly than interviews, especially in cases where the 
sample is geographically dispersed (postage is cheaper that physical visits). Another 
value in using the mail survey is that it made it possible to contact some of the 
executives who may otherwise have been inaccessible. The mail survey was used 
because it allows the respondent more time to collect facts, consults with work mates 
or fellow professionals in the field than is possible with personal interviews. The mail 
survey is more impersonal, thus provides more anonymity than the other 
communication modes. 
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However, the major weakness of the mail survey is non-response error (Dillon, 
Maffen & Firtle, 1994). Dillon et al, 1994 also note that another limitation of the mail 
survey is that the information obtained may be limited because one cannot probe 
deeply into questions. 
3.3.4 Types of Questions 
Part 2 of the questionnaire asked respondents to specify the company they 
represented, parent, spun-off or stockbroker, the drivers behind the decision to 
unbundled and to what extent these were achieved. In Part 3, the questionnaire was 
made up of closed-ended questions. Part 4 was made up of open-ended questions to 
allow respondents to write elaborate answers. After obtaining ethical clearance from 
the University's Ethics Committee, a pilot survey was conducted to pre-test the 
questionnaire. No amendments were made. 
3.3.5 Population and Sample Size 
Questionnaires were administered to financial executives of the parent, spin-off 
and stockbrokers as shown in Table 3.1 below: 

















3.4 Ethical Requirements 
An informed consent document and questionnaire were submitted to the Ethics 
Committee of the University for clearance. The informed consent document was used 
to obtained permission to contact respondents from the Chief Executive Officers of 
the selected companies after explaining the benefits of the study. The informed 
consent of the respondents was also obtained. The questionnaire itself contained a 
note to the respondents outlining the reasons and the benefits of the study. A clause 
was also included, emphasising that completion was voluntary and that responses 
would remain private and confidential and no one would be able to trace anyone's 
opinions back to them individually. 
3.5 Link between Questionnaire and the Research Questions 
In order to ensure that all the research questions developed in Chapter One are 
addressed, it is essential that there is a link between the research questions and the 
questionnaire. Questions two to four of the questionnaire address questions one to 
three of the research questions. Questions five to seven of the questionnaire seeks to 
address research question four while questions eight to eleven seek to provide answers 
to research questions five. Question twelve of the questionnaire seeks to answer 
research question six. 
3.6 Data Analysis 
The analysis was divided into three parts: the pre-unbundling, the execution and 
the time after the unbundling. The relative performance of the parent and the de-
merged entities was analysed one year prior to unbundling and up to three years after 
execution date. 
Data analysis was performed using SPSS Version-12 for Windows package as 
well as MS Excel for the spreadsheet. All information obtained through the 
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questionnaire was coded into the SPSS database. The information regarding the value 
uplift was also coded into SPSS to make statistical analysis easier. Tables of statistical 
data were presented. 
3.7 Nature and Form of Results 
Tables showing the returns before, at the time of unbundling or after and value 
uplift were produced. Statistical conclusions on the effects of unbundling on 
shareholder value and company performance were drawn. An increase in the 
shareholders' return, and uplift in value was interpreted to mean maximisation of 
shareholder wealth and improvement in performance as a result of the unbundling 
exercise. 
3.8 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Methods Used 
The use of quantitative techniques was intended to ensure that the objectives of 
the study are met and sought to ensure that all the research questions were addressed. 
The mail survey enabled contact with otherwise inaccessible investment sector 
executives and allowed for high quality and unbiased responses as respondents had 
more time to think through questions. 
The period covered January 2000 to December 2005 was short as only a few 
unbundled companies qualified for inclusion in the sample. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodology used in this study. It explained the 
quantitative methods used which are: the market based measure and accounting based 
measure. For the market-based measure, changes in the stock market prices were used 
and for accounting-based measure, a questionnaire was used in addressing the issues 
raised in the research questions. The mail survey was used, with questionnaires being 
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hand-delivered, posted or emailed. The questionnaire allowed respondents time to 
think about the questions resulting in good quality responses. It also enabled the 
researcher to obtain responses form the otherwise inaccessible executives. 
The next chapter outlines the analysis of data and the results. The analysis is 
intended to ensure that research objectives and questions outlined in Chapter One 
have been answered. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the data analysis and results of the study on the 
unbundling of listed companies in Zimbabwe. The chapter highlights the performance 
effects of unbundling as measured by the returns on investment, the value uplift of the 
emerging companies compared with that of the industrial index for up to three years 
after unbundling. The objective was to establish if positive returns were achieved 
through unbundling. Responses obtained on the questionnaires were also analysed to 
determine if the unbundling process is a viable strategy for Zimbabwean companies 
listed on the ZSE or not. In analysing data, the research questions outlined in Chapter 
One were addressed. 
4.2 Data Analysed and the Results 
4.2.1 Market Based Measure - Market Adjusted Return Model 
Though nine companies listed on the ZSE have unbundled, only seven of these 
companies qualified for inclusion in the sample as their unbundled entities were 
subsequently listed on the ZSE. Two companies that did not qualify were dropped 
from the sample. 
Share prices were adjusted for the effects of inflation in line with International 
Accounting Standard 29 for the computation of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Appendix 5 shows the share prices before adjustment for inflation and the 
prices were rising. However, after the adjustment for inflation, some of the computed 
returns from both the security and the industrial index were negative (as shown in 
Appendix 6). This was attributed to the poor performance of the Zimbabwean 
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economy as shown by the inflation levels of 585.8% in December 2005. The 
cumulative abnormal returns for both the parent companies and the spun-off 
companies are 725.4 and 559 respectively and are shown in Tables 4:1 and 4:2. These 
positive returns show that unbundling results in an increase in shareholder value. 
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Table 4.1 Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) - Parent Company 
PARENT COMPANY 
1 Year Before 
6 months Before 
Cri 
1 month After 
6 Months After 
1 Year After 
2 years After 
















































































































































Table 4.2 Cumulaatjve abnormal returns (CAR) - Spun-off company 
SPUN-OFF COMPANY 
1 month After 
6 Months Alter 
1 Year After 
2 vaars After 
3 Years After 
CRi 






























































































































































































































4.2.2 Market Based Measures - Value Uplift 
The value of shareholding before unbundling, and value of holding one year up 
to three years after unbundling in the emerging companies was determined as 
illustrated on Appendix 7. This was compared to the value uplift of the industrial 
index. The results of the study are as detailed in Tables 4:3 to 4:5 below. 
Bivariate Correlation Analysis 
According to Cooper and Schindler (2001), the Pearson (product moment) 
correlation coefficient varies over a range of +1 through 0 to -1 . Correlation 
coefficients reveal the magnitude and direction of relationships. +1 represents perfect 
positive correlation, 0 represents no correlation and -1 represents perfect negative 
correlation. The direction of the coefficient signs tells whether large values on one 
variable are associated with large values on the other (and small values with small 
values). Table 4:3 below shows the relationship between variables. The table shows 
that there is a significant relationship between the year of unbundling and value uplift 
in years two and three at the 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. However, the analysis 
also shows that there is no significant relationship between year of unbundling and 
value uplift in year one. The table also shows that there is negative correlation 
between the number of resultant companies after unbundling and value uplift as 
shown by the p values in years one, two and three (post unbundling) which are greater 
than 0.05. This shows that the number of resultant companies does not have an effect 
on the overall performance of an unbundled company. 
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Table 4.3 Analysis of correlations 
Category-Unbundled 
firm or Industrial Index 
Year of Unbundling 
Number of Resultant 
Companies Post-
Unbundling 
Value Uplift Year 1 
Value Uplift Year 2 











































































































































** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The statistical method for testing the null hypothesis that the means of several 
populations are equal is the analysis of variance (ANOVA). One-way analysis of 
variance was used in this study. According to Cooper and Schindler (2001) one-way 
ANOVA is a single factor, fixed effects model to compare the effects of one factor on 
a continuous dependent variable. ANOVA uses squared deviations of the variance so 
computations of the distances of individual data points from their own mean can be 
summed. The total deviation of any particular data point may be partitioned into 
between groups variance and within groups variance as shown in Table 4:5 below. 
The within groups variance describes the deviations of the data points within each 
group from the sample mean. This results from variability among subjects and from 
random variation. The test statistic for ANOVA is the F ratio. If the null hypothesis is 
true, there should be no difference between the populations and the ratio is close to 
one. From Table 4.5 above, the population means are not equal and the F ratio is 
greater than 1 for the three years under study. The null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between value uplift of the resultant companies and the industrial index is 
thus rejected in all cases. This shows that in both the short run and the long run, the 
differences in the mean returns between the resultant companies and the industrial 
index is statistically significant. The value uplift from year one to three for the 
resultant companies is higher than the value uplift from the industrial index. This 
means that investors buying into the unbundling companies are in a position to realise 
higher returns. Habib et a/.,'s (1997) findings support the value uplift concept. They 
observed that a spin off will lead to an increase in the number of shares that are traded 
on the market. This makes the price system more informative and hence leads to 
decrease in information asymmetry. This decrease in information asymmetry will lead 
to an increase in the total value of the firm and its spun-off subsidiary. The descriptive 
statistic and ANOVA results are presented in Tables 4:4 and 4:5. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics used for variance analysis 
Value Uplift Year 1 Unbundled Firm 
Industrial Index 
Total 
Value Uplift Year 2 Unbundled Firm 
Industrial Index 
Total 






















95% Confidence Interval for 
I Mean 
Std. Deviation Std. Error j Lower Bound 
528.738 ! 199.844 , -13.00 
127.927 48.352 , 112.12 
390.920 j 104.478 ! 127.50 
2156.581 , 815.111 ! 211.50 
373.957 ! 141.343 ; 360.72 
1678.211 | 448.521 487.32 
23628.428 i 8930.706 : -4487.37 
1614.157 '' 610.094 ! 1710.01 































Table 4:5 Analyses Of Variance (ANOVA) 
Value Uplift Year 1 
Value Uplift Year 2 














































4.2.3 Questionnaire Analysis 
Questionnaires were administered on financial executives of the parent, spun-off 
companies and stockbrokers. Twenty-five responses were received distributed among 
the three categories of respondents as shown in table 4.6 below: An overall response 
rate of 73% was achieved. 





















The 73%) response rate was achieved because preliminary telephone calls made 
to respondents helped ensure a high response as some respondents opted to complete 
and return the questionnaire at the time of delivery. Though follow-ups were made by 
telephone and email to improve the response rate, 34%> of the stockbrokers did not 
return completed questionnaires. On the other hand, the response from parent 
companies and spun-off companies was relatively good. The results of the 
questionnaire analysis are detailed in Tables 4:7 to 4:24 below: 
Q1. Category of Entity or Company 





























Of the twenty-five responses received, 24% were from the parent companies, 
28% from spun-off companies and 48% were from the stockbrokers. Though 
responses of the parent and spun-off constitute 24% and 28% respectively, their 
response rates compared to the targeted sample were higher. This was attributed to the 
fact that the financial executives in these companies had information readily available 
for answering the questionnaires as compared to stockbrokers. 
Q2. Factors behind the Decision to Unbundled 
Table 4:8 Significant unbundling drivers 
Focus on core competencies 
Realise potential as a 
standalone entity 
Eliminate inefficiencies 
Unlock shareholder value 
Facilitate future growth 
No synergy in the business 


























The three most significant drivers for the decision to unbundle as outlined in 
Table 4.8 above are: unlocking shareholder value, the need to focus on core 
competences and facilitation of future growth. The need to unlock shareholder value 
was mentioned by 92% of the respondents, which means that though there are several 
drivers, unlocking shareholder value is the most significant. 
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Q3. Extent to Which the Drivers Were Achieved 
Table 4:9 Extent of achieving unbundling drivers 
Focus on core competencies 
Realise potential as a 
standalone entity 
Eliminate inefficiencies 
Unlock shareholder value 
Facilitate future growth 
No synergy in the business 
Increase visibility of a firm 






















Respondents indicated that the drivers for the decision to unbundle were 
achieved, with the extent of achieving them lying in the 76-100% range as shown in 
the Table 4:9 above. 12% of the respondents that identified unlocking shareholder 
value as a driver indicated that the extent of achieving it was above 100%, which 
shows that unbundling unlocks shareholder value. 
Q4. Is there a Relationship between Unbundling and Increase in Shareholder 
Value? 
Table 4:10 Relationship between unbundling and shareholder value 






All the respondents highlighted that there is a relationship between unbundling 
and an increase in shareholder value as shown in Table 4:10. Consequently an 
investor would benefit from investing in an unbundling company. 
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Q5. Shareholder Returns 6 Months before Unbundling 
Table 4:11 Returns 6 months before unbundling 
How do you rate the returns on 
shareholder investment 6 months 
before unbundling 





Seventy-two percent of the respondents highlighted that returns were fair and 
twenty-eight indicated that the returns were poor six months before unbundling. This 
shows that returns are not responding positively to the news of the pending 
unbundling exercise. 
Q6. Shareholder Returns on Unbundling Date 
Table 4:12 returns on unbundling 
How do you rate the returns on 
shareholder investment on the 
unbundling date 




Poor Very Poor 
The ratings by respondents of returns are gradually shifting from fair and poor 
six months before unbundling to fair (44% of respondents) and good (56% of the 
respondents) on unbundling date. This shows that returns improve on the unbundling 
day when the unbundled entities are listed. 
Q7. Shareholder Returns after Unbundling 
Table 4:13 Returns after unbundling 
How do you rate the returns on 






Fair Poor Very Poor 
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Eighty-eight percent of the respondents indicated that the returns after 
unbundling were very good and twelve percent indicated that the returns were good. 
In Table 4:11 to 4:13 the responses given by the respondents are in line with the 
findings of Krisnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Habib et al. (1997), that a 
decrease in information asymmetry will lead to an increase in the total value of the 
firm and its spun-off subsidiary. The information hypothesis predicts that the level of 
information asymmetry will decrease for these firms after the completion of the 
unbundling process. According to the respondents, the returns are moving from being 
fair and poor six months before unbundling to good and very good after unbundling. 
Q8. Impact of unbundling on turnover 1 year after unbundling 




















Tables 4:14 to 4:17 show that the improvement in performance is gradual. 
Ninety-two percent of the respondents indicated that turnover increased from 26-50% 
after the first year and eight percent indicated that increase in turnover of between 0-
25 percent was realized in the first year. The turnover improves as the unbundled 
entities focus on core businesses. 
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Q9. Impact of unbundling on turnover 2 years after unbundling 



















Q10. Impact of unbundling on turnover 3 years after unbundling 


























According to 84% of the respondents in Table 4.16 above, turnover in the third 
year increases by between 76 to 100% as a result of unbundling. All respondents 
indicated that there are improvements in turnover as a result of unbundling. 
Qll. Impact on profitability and activity ratios 
a) Impact of on operating profit margin 3 years after 
Table 4:17 Impact on operating profit margin 






Valid Percent Percent 
100.0 : 100.0 
Operating profit margin is an indication of the firm's profitability from current 
operations without regard to the interest charges accruing from the capital structure. 
All of the respondents indicated that unbundling improves operating profit margin 
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with increases of between 51-100%. It can therefore be interpreted that unbundling 
improves the operating profit margin. 
b) Impact of unbundling on earnings per share 3 years after 
Table 4.18 Impact on Earnings per share 






Valid Percent : Percent 
100.0 j 100.0 
(Source: Respondents) 
The Earnings Per Share ratio shows the earnings available to the owners of 
each share of common stock. All the respondents show that unbundling result in an 
increase in the Earnings Per Share (EPS) (as shown in Table 4:18) that range from 51 
to 100%, indicating that it is worthwhile to invest in a company that is about to 
unbundle. 
c) Impact of unbundling on inventory turnover 3 years after 
Table 4:19 Impact on inventory turnover 






Valid Percent i Percent 
100.0 ! 100.0 
Inventory turnover provides an indication of whether a company has excessive 
or inadequate finished goods inventory. Hundred percent (100%) of the respondents 
as shown in Table 4:19 indicated that unbundling results in an increase of between 51-
100% in inventory turnover. A high turnover implies that the entity does not hold 
excessive stocks of inventories that are unproductive and lessen its profitability. 
d) Impact of unbundling on total assets turnover 3 years after 
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Table 4:20 Impact on total assets turnover 






Valid Percent Percent 
100.0 : 100.0 
Respondents to the survey also indicated that unbundling results in an increase 
in total assets turnover of between 51-100% as shown in Table 4:20 above. Total 
assets turnover is a measure of the utilisation of all the firm's assets. Unbundling 
therefore results in the efficient and effective utilisation of the firm's assets as each 
entity begins to focus on its core business in the process putting all the assets to full 
use. 
Q12. Is unbundling a viable strategy for listed companies? 












All the respondents (as shown in Table 4:21 above) indicated that unbundling is 
a viable strategy for listed companies in Zimbabwe. Respondents indicated that there 
were two major reasons why unbundling is a considered a viable strategy for 
conglomerates. The reasons advanced were that returns on shareholder investment 
improved and that there was an improvement in performance as a result of the 
unbundling process. Eighty percent of the twenty five respondents indicated that 
unbundling was a viable strategy for conglomerates because it leads to an increase in 
shareholder returns. Thirty-six percent of the respondents also indicated that 
unbundling was a viable strategy because it s results in improved performance as 
shown in Tables 4:22 and 4:23 below respectively. 
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Reason 1: Unbundling viable strategy-returns on shareholder investment improved 




Frequency ; Percent ' Valid Percent 
20 i 80.0 ; 80.0 
5 : 20.0 : 20.0 






Reason 2: Unbundling viable strategy-Improvement in performance 




Frequency Percent j Valid Percent 
9 ' 36.0 I 36.0 
16 64.0 | 64.0 






This chapter has presented the findings on the performance of the conglomerate 
before and after unbundling. The findings were that cumulative abnormal returns 
were realised through unbundling and that there was value uplift in the resultant 
companies as compared to the industrial index and hence an investor would benefit 
from investing in a company that is planning to unbundle. The study also established 
that there are several drivers for the decision to unbundle but the most significant was 
to unlock shareholder value. It was also established that there is a relationship 
between unbundling and an increase in shareholder value and that unbundling is a 
viable strategy for conglomerates. The reason being that as companies focus on core 
competences, performance improves as well as returns to shareholders. 
Chapter Five contains conclusions, recommendations made from the study 
and direction for future research on unbundling. 
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C H A P T E R 5 
C O N C L U S I O N A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S 
5.1 Introduction 
This study sought to establish whether the unbundling of conglomerates unlocks 
or results in an increase in shareholder value and improved performance of the 
resultant companies overall and draw conclusions on whether unbundling is a viable 
strategy for listed conglomerates. The study further sought to establish the stages at 
which any increase in shareholder returns accrues, the most significant drivers behind 
the decision to unbundle and whether there is a relationship between unbundling and 
increase in share price. 
This chapter is organised as follows: conclusions drawn from the study and 
based on the data analysis in Chapter Four are discussed followed by 
recommendations. Limitations of the study are discussed next followed by a 
discussion of directions for future research. 
5.2 Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this study: 
5.2.1 Unlocking of Shareholder Value 
The unbundling of conglomerates results in the unlocking of shareholder value 
as measured by the cumulative abnormal returns as shown in Tables 4:1 and 4:2. 
Firms that unbundle in experience an increase performance when the results of the 
resultant companies are combined. Unbundling unlocks shareholder value as it 
provides an additional investment opportunity for the existing shareholders to 
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participate on separately listed companies (after the shareholders have been allocated 
additional shares in the spun-off companies). 
5.2.2 Performance Improvement 
Unbundling is a viable strategy as performance measured in terms of turnover, 
operating profit margin, assets turnover and earnings per share ratios improves after 
unbundling. This shows that unbundling enhances management of smaller units since 
normally as the organisation grows through diversification (before unbundling), 
managerial diseconomies of scale tend to occur, resulting in difficulty in managing 
the conglomerate. As a result of management being able to focus on smaller units 
there will be improved efficiency and productivity on the unbundled division. 
As shown by the exceptional performance of the unbundled conglomerates that 
unbundled their operations, it is likely that more companies will follow the 
unbundling route. Investors have had an opportunity to study the growing literature on 
unbundling and tend to position themselves in companies that announce unbundling 
plans, as they tend to benefit significantly. 
5.2.3 Value Uplift 
Unbundling in the form of a spin-off results in an increase in number of shares 
for the existing shareholders and the value uplift for the resultant companies is greater 
than the value uplift from the industrial index. Consequently an investor would 
benefit from investing in a company that has got plans to unbundle. Similarly existing 
investors in a company that is planning to unbundle would be better off not disposing 
of their shareholding in the parent company. Such investors should wait for the 
unbundling process to take effect and realise the benefits. 
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5.2.4 Drivers to the Decision to Unbundle 
Though there are several drivers, the unlocking shareholder value is the most 
significant followed by the need to focus on core competences and facilitation of 
future growth. Opportunities for the enhancement of long-term growth are made 
available to the parent company as a result of its operational focus being centred on its 
core business after the unbundling process. Other drivers behind the decision to 
unbundle include the need to increase visibility of the firm, eliminate inefficiencies in 
the business, realise potential as a standalone entity and to address the lack of synergy 
in businesses. The stated drivers for unbundling were successfully achieved and it can 
therefore be concluded that unbundling maximises shareholder, enables companies to 
focus on core competences and facilitates future growth. 
Unbundling is the most equitable and consistent means by which critical 
empowerment objectives can be achieved, allowing for the meaningful participation 
in the spun off company by the spun off company management and employees 
together with other investors after completion of the unbundling. This also ensures 
that the spun off company is adequately capitalised on the implementation of the 
proposed unbundling and after the listing. Unbundling enables the spun off company 
to pursue financial policies and strategies considered appropriate for itself and 
consistent with its operations and sector. Unbundling facilitates the investment by a 
class of shareholders who would not normally be attracted to the conglomerates as 
previously constituted. Unbundling widens the pool of potential investors and thereby 
enhances trading and liquidity. 
5.2.5 Elimination of Information Asymmetries 
Though returns to shareholder six months before unbundling range from poor to 
fair, the returns improve after unbundling as the firms are undervalued due to 
information asymmetry. Such firms experience an improvement in market valuation 
when they divest through spin-off The spun-off company assumes increased visibility 
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within the financial community and its unbundling will enable the financial 
community to better evaluate its performance hence increasing the prospects of proper 
recognition by the financial community. 
5.3 Recommendations 
Investors should position themselves in companies that announce unbundling 
plans, as they tend to benefit significantly from increases in returns and uplift in value 
resulting from more shares being traded when shareholders in the parent company are 
allocated additional shares in the spun off companies. 
Existing shareholders in a conglomerate with plans for unbundling should avoid 
disposing of their shareholding in the company until after the allocation of additional 
shares in the spun-off companies. 
Conglomerates that realise that diversification has resulted in inefficiencies that 
may lead to declines in performances or that there is no synergy between businesses 
should unbundled with a view to unlocking shareholder value and focus on core 
competences. 
Unbundling frees managerial, administrative and financial resources to 
concentrate on strategic projects; it increases the firm-specific risk (compared to a 
diversified company which is considered to be less risky) thus aligning the company's 
actions with the interests of the shareholders according to the agency perspective and 
decreases transaction costs in the form of administrative and managerial burden. 
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5.4 Limitations of study 
Only seven parent companies unbundled their operation during the period 2000 
and December 2005. The conclusions drawn are based on the study of a small sample 
of companies listed on the ZSE. 
5.5 Directions for future research 
While this study has shown that unbundling unlocks shareholder value, it did 
not cover other aspects of unbundling such as the effects on human resources, the 
steps of the unbundling process. There is therefore need for further studies on the 
issues outlined below: 
5.5.1 Need for Process Studies 
The exiting literature focuses on antecedents and outcomes. More research is 
needed on the process of unbundling and the decision-making dynamics. Research on 
the unbundling process could distinguish between intended and unanticipated 
outcomes. Studies focussing on the economic outcome of unbundling have neglected 
variables at the process management level. Studies that focus on the link between 
corporate characteristics, such as the management team, and economic outcome, fail 
to explain hoe the management team or employees' perception, other than on lay-offs 
affect the outcome of the unbundling process. Factors at process level rather that 
simple antecedents may affect the outcome of the unbundling operation and enhance a 
firm's competitive position and performance. 
5.5.2 Need for Studies on Long-Term Effects 
Analysis of the long-term consequences of unbundling could help managers to 
understand how they can determine ex ante whether unbundling will increase their 
firm's value and in which divesting modes such value is maximised. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Carve out/ partial spin off: A parent company sells a stake for less than 20% in an 
initial public offering and/or rights offering and typically will spin off the 
remaining interest to existing shareholders at a later date. This sale provides 
capital to the parent and a completely new shareholder base for the public 
portion of the subsidiary. 
Company performance: the growth and performance, which ensure the profitability 
of businesses. 
Dividend-in-specie/ distribution-in-specie: shares in the company to be unbundled 
are distributed to shareholders of the parent company. 
Resultant companies: the companies emerging after unbundling that is the parent 
and spun-off companies. 
Share Price: is representative of all future earnings discounted at an appropriate rate 
or the value of a share on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). 
Shareholder wealth maximisation: the maximisation of shareholder's purchasing 
power. In an efficient market, it is the maximisation of the current share price. 
Spin off: a parent company distributes some or all of its equity ownership in a 
subsidiary company as a pro-rata dividend to its shareholders. After the 
distribution, the operations and management of the subsidiary are separated 
from those of the parent. 
Split off: A distribution by a parent company of a subsidiary's stock to its 
shareholders in exchange for shares of the parent company's stock. 
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Split up: a distribution by a parent company of the shares of two or more subsidiary 
companies in exchange for all the parent company's stock, followed by the 
liquidation of the parent company. The parent company's former shareholders 
become shareholders of the subsidiary companies. 
Spun-off company: subsidiary company that has been unbundled. 
Unlock shareholder value: the stock market's ability to put a higher value on the 
businesses that make up a conglomerate if they trade as separate companies. 
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Appendix 2 Informed Consent Document 
FACULTY 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU NATAL 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY Respondent code.. 
Voluntary questionnaire for listed companies on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) 
that have unbundled 
Research Topic: Unbundling of Listed Companies: Does It Unlock Shareholder Value and 
Improve Performance? A Case for Zimbabwe 
Researcher: Tambudzayi FurameraTel 04 610663, Email furamerat@yahoo.com 
Supervisor: Dr J MacDonald, Email: J0hnm@pmi-sa.C0.za 
Graduate School of Business, University of KwaZulu Natal 
Note to respondent 
This study is conducted to determine to what extent the unbundling exercise has 
achieved intended objectives of companies that unbundled, and to determine the 
optimal timing of investing in the company before or after unbundling. 
• Although the survey is voluntary, your input would be extremely valuable in helping 
to determine optimal unbundling strategies for Zimbabwean companies. 
• The survey is targeting financial executives, investment analysts and investors in the 
companies that have unbundled. 
• Your response to this questionnaire will remain private and confidential. No one will 
be able to trace your opinions back to you individually or to your organisation. 
• Participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any stage 
and for any reason. 
This questionnaire consist of four parts: 
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• Part 1 asks for permission to use your response for an academic research; 
• Part 2 asks for the category into which your organisation falls and the drivers of 
unbundling. 
• Part 3 asks for information about your opinion on the unbundling process. 
• Part 4 deals with open ended questions in which you are requested to give reasons in 
support of your answer. 
The results of the study will be made available to the participating organisations on request. 
All data collected will be kept at home and any papers containing data will be shredded at the 
end of the study. Data saved on disks will also be deleted upon completion of the study. 
Your prompt response, no latter than 15 November 2006, would be highly appreciated. 
Participant Declaration 
I (Full names of participant) hereby confirm 
that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, 
and I consent to participating in the research project. 
I understand that 1 am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. 






Voluntary questionnaire for listed companies on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange that have 
unbundled 
Unbundling of listed companies: Does It Unlock Shareholder Value and Improve 
Performance? A Case for Zimbabwe 
Researcher: Tambudzayi Furamera - Tel.: 04 610663, 
furamerat&yahoo. com) 
Supervisor: Dr J MacDonald, Email johnm@pmi-sa.co.za 
Graduate School of Business, University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Notes to the respondent 
This study is conducted to determine to what extent the unbundling exercise has achieved 
intended objectives of companies that unbundled, and to determine the optimal timing of 
investing in the company before or after unbundling. 
• Although the survey is voluntary, your input would be extremely valuable in helping 
to determine optimal unbundling strategies for Zimbabwean companies. 
• Your response to this questionnaire will remain private and confidential. No one will 
be able to trace your opinions back to you individually, or to your organisation. 
This questionnaire consists of four parts: 
• Part 1 asks for permission to use your response for an academic research; 
• Part 2 asks for the category into which your organisation falls and the drivers of 
unbundling. 
• Part 3 asks for information about your opinion on the unbundling process. 
• Part 4 deals with open ended questions in which you are requested to give reasons in 
support of your answer. 
82 
How to complete the questionnaire 
• Please answer all questions by ticking (V) the appropriate box and or writing in the 
space provided. Where the space provided is not adequate please feel free to use and 
attach an extra sheet. 
• Please answer the questions as best as you can and be sure to read and follow the 
instructions for each part. 
The results of the study will be made available to the participating organisations on request. 
Your prompt response, no latter than 15 November 2006, would be highly appreciated. 
Thank you very much for taking your time to complete this questionnaire. 
Part 1: Permission to use responses 
I (name) hereby give permission that my responses may be 
used for research purposes provided that my identity and that of my organisation is not 
revealed in the published records of the research. 
Postal address (for mailing results to participants): 
Contact numbers: Work: Mobile: 
Part 2: Please complete the following information about your organization 
1. What category of entity does your organisation fall in? (Tick (*0 the appropriate 
option) 
u J Parent company Q Spun-off company Q Stockbroker 
2. What were the most significant benefits or drivers behind the decision to unbundle? 
a. 
c. 





0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-100% 100%+ 
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Part 3: The unbundling process 
Please show your rating on each of the questions by ticking (S) the appropriate box. 
4. Is there a relationship between unbundling and an increase in shareholder value? 
Yes No 
5. How do you rate the returns on shareholder investment 6 months before unbundling. 
• Very Good DGood D F a i r • Poor [ jVery 
poor 
6. How do you rate the returns on shareholder investment on the unbundling date. 
• Very Good • G o o d • F a i r • P o o r Q V e r y 
poor 
7. How do you rate the returns on shareholder investment after unbundling. 
• Very Good • G o o d • Fair • Poor 
poor 
• Very 
8. What was the impact of unbundling on turnover 1 year after unbundling? 
I—I r\.">w„ I—I ">£_<;no/„ I—I ^1_7W„ I—I -7£<>/„_inno/„ I—I 0-25% 
100% 
26-50% 51-75% 76%-100% 
9. What was the impact of unbundling on turnover 2 years after unbundling? 
7£_^fW„ I—I ^1_7W„ • 7£o/„_inno/„ • 0-25% 
100% 
26-50% 51-75% 76%-100% 
over 
over 
10. What was the impact of unbundling on turnover 3 years after unbundling? 
^ 0-25% ^ 2 6 - 5 0 % I—' 51-75% ^ J 76o / o .100o / o • 
100% 








Operating Profit margin 
Earnings per Share 
Activity Ratios 
Inventory Turnover 
Total asset turnover 
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Part 4. Please fill in the following information, giving reasons in support of 
your answer. 
12. In your opinion is unbundling a viable strategy for companies listed on the ZSE? 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. 
Please return the completed questionnaire by 15 November 2006 in the self-addressed and 
stamped envelope that accompanied it. 
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Appendix 4 
SHARE PERFOMANCE REVIEW (BEFORE INFLATION ADJUSTMENTS) 
Table Showing Comparative Movement of Share Price Before and After Unbundling 
SHARE PRICES IN CENTS 
Parent 
































































































































































































































































































SHARE PERFOMANCE REVIEW- INFLATION ADJUSTED 
Table Showing Comparative Movement of Share Price Before and After Unbundling and Retuns 








1 Yr Before 
413,906 
8,764,783 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ILLUSTRATION OF VALUE UPLIFT 
ASTRA HOLDINGS LTD 
Initial Holding 
Share price on unbundling anouncement 




New shares received 
Cairns 
TPH 
Proportion Share holding 
0 1000 
0 1000 




No. of shares Share price Value of Holding 
1000 55,000 55,000,000 
1000 6,000 6,000,000 
1000 40,000 40,000,000 
101,000,000 
Value Uplift % 
Industrial index at unbundling 
Industrial index as at 
Industrial index -Value uplift 
DELTA CORPORATION 
Initial Holding 
Share price on unbundling anouncement 
Value of Holding on unbundling 









Value Uplift % 
Industrial index at unbundling 
Industrial index as at 
Industrial index -Value uplift 
Pro 
No. 








































Share price on unbundling anouncement 
Value of Holding on unbundling 
New shares received 
Art 







Value as at No. of shares Share price Value of Holding 
TZI 1000 10,100 10,100,000 




Value Uplift % 
Industrial index at unbundling 
Industrial index 







Share price on unbundling anouncement 
Value of Holding on unbundling 
New shares received Proportion Share holding 
General Be 0.2 200 
Steelnet 1.16 1160 




Value as at 




Industrial index at unbundling 
Industrial index 
Industrial index -Value uplift 













T A Holdings 
Initial Holding 
Share price on unbundling anouncement 




New shares received 
Zimnat 




Value as at 
T A 
Zimnat 
Value Uplift % 
Industrial index at unbundling 
Industrial index 
Industrial index -Value uplift 















Share price on unbundling anouncement 




New shares received Proportion Share holding 
Power 20 200 
0 0 
Value as at No. of shares Share price Value of Holding 
Mash 1000 4,000 4,000,000 
Power 200 96,000 19,200,000 
0 
23,200,000 
Value Uplift % 
Industrial index at unbundling 
Industrial index 









Share price on unbundling anoui 
Value of Holding on unbundling 
New shares received 
Phoenix 




Proportion Share holding 
0 1000 
0 0 














Value Uplift % 66,567 % 
Industrial index on unbundling 
Industrial index 
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